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The conception of the socially embedded
individual
John B. Davis

Social economics differs in many respects from standard mainstream economics, but one of the most fundamental differences is that it employs a
conception of the human individual as socially embedded rather than as
atomistic. Indeed, just as the atomistic individual conception is one of the
defining characteristics of mainstream economics, so the socially embedded individual conception is one of the defining characteristics of social
economics. Broadly speaking, the difference between these two conceptions
rests on whether individuals and their behavior are explained 'externally' in
terms of their social relationships or 'internally' in terms of their private
tastes and preferences. The former perspective sees sociallife as intrinsic to
our understanding of individuals as social beings; the latter perspective
operates with a view of social life restricted to the market interaction of
individuals understood as non-social beings. It follows that these two conceptions of the individual also support two different normative visions of
individuals and society. The socially embedded individual conception is
associated with normative principies that emphasize relationships between
people, such as equality, fairness and the (positive) freedom to achieve,
whereas the atomistic individual conception is associated with normative
principies that emphasize the independence of individuals, such as autonomy, rights and (negative) freedom from social interference. We can characterize the former approach as a social justice view and the latter approach
as a liberal society view. Each has strongly contrasting social economic
policy recommendations associated with it, particularly with respect to the
role given to the market in modern economies, and indeed much of modern
history can be explained in terms of conflicting horizons laid out by these
two views.
This chapter is devoted to explaining the socially embedded individual
conception. Given that there are many ways in which social relationships
can be discussed, there are also many ways in which individuals can be
understood to be socially embedded. The first section of the chapter
accordingly surveys a variety of recent contributions to this understanding,
giving attention both to those that explicitly develop socially embedded
individual conceptions and also to those that do so more indirectly by
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criticizing the standard atomistic individual conception. The second and
third sections then discuss two fundamental issues raised by these contributions: (a) the relation of social identity to personal identity, and (b) the
problem of inequality. The fourth section el oses the chapter with comments
on how thinking about individuals in economics may evolve in the future.

l. Recent contributions to the conception of the socially embedded
individual
An important challenge to the conception of the socially embedded individual is to explain how individuals can still be individual when socially
embedded. There has been a long debate in economics between proponents
of methodological individualism - the idea that economic explanations
should take individuals as entry points - and proponents of methodological holism - the idea that economic explanations should take social aggregates (such as classes, social groups etc.) as entry points. Critics of the
atomistic individual conception who also reject methodological individualism thus often also adopt methodological holism as their perspective, and
accordingly sometimes find themselves treating 'socially embedded individual' as an oxymoron. Their reasoning is that as social structures are
primary, they must be determinative of individual behavior (just as
methodological individualists argue that as individuals are primary, they
must be determinative of social structures). But both perspectives are too
narrow since it can be argued that social structures influence individuals
and that individuals also influence social structures, and thus that each constitute independent agents. On this wider view, then, 'socially embedded
individual' is a meaningful conception whose understanding requires the
analysis of both types of influences.
This has been done by many in connection with a cross-disciplinary
social science and philosophy investigation termed structure- agency
theory, whose premise is that individuals and societies both need to be
explained in terms of their mutual influences upon one another. Sociologist
Mark Granovetter stated this in an especially influential way in arguing that
socially embedded individuals are neither 'atoms outside a social context'
nor beings who 'adhere slavishly toa script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories they happen to occupy' (Granovetter,
1985, p. 487). Sociologist Anthony Giddens advanced one particular view
of structure- agent interactions he termed 'structuration theory', which
treats individuals and social structures as interdependent and inseparable or as a duality of structure (Giddens, 1976). Economist Tony
Lawson argues that 'social structure [is] dependent upon human agency ...
open to transformation through changing human practices' (Lawson, 1997,
p. 158).
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But how is it, we should ask, that individuals are indeed agents when
social structures are said to affect them? Put differently, how can we invest
individuals with a relative autonomy when we recognize they are acted
upon by society? The answer lies in deepening the concept of the individual as an agent to include the idea of being a reflexive being. A long history
of social psychology (cf. Davis, 2003, pp. 114fT.) treats individuals as
reflexive beings in virtue of their ability to form self-concepts and engage
in different kinds of self-referring behavior. Of course social factors
influence how individuals form self-concepts, but the idea that they are able
to reflexively take themselves as subjects as objects of their thinking and
activity, or objectify themselves as subjects, implies that individuals can
detach themselves in sorne degree from the determining effects of social
factors influencing them. This relative detachment allows us to suppose
that individuals also influence social structures, just as social structures
influence individuals, and enables us to then treat the idea of the individual
being socially embedded as a coherent and meaningful conception.
We can accordingly first distinguish explicit contributions to the socially
embedded individual conception as those that employ sorne sort of structure-agent modeling of individual and society and which characterize
individuals in sorne fashion as reflexive beings. Six different types of contributions fall within this description: social economic, institutionalist, critica! realist, feminist, intersubjectivist and expressivist.
The social economic conception of the socially embedded individual is
often referred toas Hamo socio-economicus (O'Boyle, 1994). As Mark Lutz
puts it, 'persons as social individuals are embedded in a web of constitutive
social relations' (Lutz, 1999, p. 6) such as community, family, anda variety
of wider social relationships, all of which support different sets of social
values that individuals rely upon to guide their daily lives. Economic relationships, such as consumption, production and exchange, then, are framed
by these constitutive social relations, so that social values always underlie
economic values. Lutz accordingly explains the individual as a dual self in
that individuals possess first-order preferences over goods and work and
also second-order or social value preferences over these first-order preferences. David George uses this framework to argue that pro-market policies
often promote first-order preferences at the expense of second-order ones,
as for example when individuals are encouraged to consume products they
believe they should avoid (George, 2001). Amartya Sen brings out the
reflexivity inherent in this dual self-conception of the individual when he
characterizes individuals as beings able to engage in rational self-scrutiny
(Sen, 2002). One way in which individuals can be seen to exercise rational
self-scrutiny in their interaction with others is captured by collective
intentionality theory. When individuals express intentions using the 'we'
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pronoun, they need to ask themselves whether those to whom the 'we'
applies would agree with what they express (Davis, 2003, ch. 7). In such settings, individuals are both influenced by social relationships and social
structures, and influence them as well, with the latter depending upon their
ability to place themselves in social contexts.
Thinking about the individual in institutionalist economics goes back to
Charles Cooley's 'looking-glass self' that makes how individuals judge
themselves a matter of how they believe they appear to others (Cooley,
1902, pp. 179ff.). George Mead's symbolic interactionism later expanded
this view to include the idea that the mind and self are products of social
processes (Mead, 1934), so that self-reflection is embedded in social life.
Institutionalism originates in the evolutionary views of Thorstein Veblen
and the idea that social processes evolve. In a structure- agent framework,
the evolution of the economy as a social economic process involves 'both
the dependence of institutions upon individuals and the molding of individuals by institutions' - both 'upward and downward causation' processes
(Hodgson, 2000, p. 326). Upward causation, which occurs when individuals influence and create institutions, depends upon learning seen as a
recursive social practice. Individuals develop habits around social rules and
customs in their social environment, but modify those habits as they adjust
them to their own circumstances. At the same time, individuals not only
rely on social rules and customs and tailor them to their own cases, but they
also do this as social rules and customs themselves evolve in response to the
actions of individuals (Dolfsma, 2002). The institutionalist learning-based
view of individuals, then, treats individuals as socially embedded, reflexive
beings constantly adjusting to their own changing circumstances in a historical process that is itself dynamic.
Tony Lawson develops a critica! realist understanding of the structureagent model that makes 'social structure dependent upon human agency
... open to transformation through changing human practices which in
turn can be affected by criticising the conceptions and understandings on
which people act' (Lawson, 1997, p. 158). Social structure changes because
human practices change as a result of individuals' reflection upon them and
their place within them. Lawson characterizes the rationality of individuals thus understood as a 'situated rationality' in which individuals occupy
social positions structured by rules, obligations and the powers that accompany them, and act within this social space. Much of this activity is routinized and relies on tacit knowledge and skills that individuals exercise
unconsciously. Yet that this activity can beco me conscious means that it can
still be seen as intentional. The overall structure- agent model that Lawson
employs, then, is one in which social structures and human agency coevolve in social processes that reproduce and transform them both.
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Individuals are refiexive beings, but the basis on which they are is continually changing. This arguably produces a need in individuals for an 'inner
security' in the form of 'a significant degree of continuity, stability and
sameness in daily affairs' (ibid., p. 180). Put in terms of the concept of the
individual, socially embedded individuals exhibit a need for an 'ontological security' that preserves their status as individual agents in a social world
that is constantly changing.
Feminist economists emphasize the social construction of individuallife
in terms of such social identities as gender, race or ethnicity, nationality,
etc. As Nancy Folbre puts it, 'individuals are so embedded in a complex
structure of individual and collective identities and competing interpretations of these that sometimes they do not even know whose interests they
are acting on' (Folbre, 1994, p. 16). For example, women have quite
different social identities associated with work and family, and often find
their responsibilities to each domain in confiict. This shows, however, that
individuals cannot be reduced to their social identities, since they must
determine how they organize and negotiate these different domains. In this
regard, they are refiexive beings who evaluate how they believe they fit into
the social relationships they occupy. At the same time, how many individuals together respond to their many social relationships in turn infiuences
the development of social structures themselves. One manifestation of this
is social economic policy designed to improve the capacity of women to
operate in multiple domains, such as legislation aimed at discriminatory
practices in the workplace that penalize women for household caring
responsibilities. Thus feminists also employ a socially embedded individual conception, and treat individuals and social structures as mutually
infiuencing.
Two additional conceptions of individuals as socially embedded are
intersubjectivist economics (or French conventions theory) and the expressivist individual view. Intersubjectivist economics (Dupuy, 1989; Orlean,
1992; Thévenot, 1989) draws on the phenomenon of speculation in
financia! markets to argue that 'what we think, desire and decide as economic actors depends a great deal on what other actors are seen to think,
desire, and decide' (Fullbrook, 2002, p. 2). Individuals thus explained
exhibit strategic rationality, whereby they take into account whether others
will cooperate or compete, and also a communicational rationality,
whereby they make shared commitments to various norms and social
conventions. The expressivist individual view is developed by Shaun
Hargreaves Heap (2001), who focuses on individuals' refiective capacities
and sense of self-worth, and Philippe Fontaine (1997), who focuses on the
differences and relationships between individuals' sympathetic and
empathic identification with others. Both views are influenced by Adam
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Smith's 'impartía! spectator' perspective that individuals can adopt to judge
their relations to others (Smith, 1976 [1759]).
In addition to these six socially embedded individual conceptions, there
exist contributions to thinking about the individual in economics in recent
mainstream economics that make more indirect contributions to thinking
about individuals as socially embedded. Two are discussed here. Behavioral
economics, whose origins lie in psychology, and complexity economics,
whose sources are physics and biology, both make cases for seeing individuals as socially embedded by criticizing different aspects of the standard
atomistic individual conception.
Behavioral economics emphasizes the need to replace the standard view
of the individual as Romo economicus by a more realistic conception of the
individual as Romo sapiens. Whereas the former is a hyperrational being,
for the latter 'the degree of rationality bestowed to the agents depends on
the context being studied' (Thaler, 2000, p. 134). Of course 'context' can
mean many things, and indeed in much of behavioral economics research
it is treated as a relatively abstract principie. For example, contrary to the
standard view of choice, behavioralists argue that individual decisionmaking exhibits framing effects and reference-dependence reflecting the
anchoring of choice in particular circumstances (Tversky and Kahneman,
1991). But many of the applications of these concepts give the principie of
context important social content. Thus framing effects and the referencedependence of choice have been shown to produce hyperbolic time
discounting, which implies that people tend to ignore the future.
Behavioralists have accordingly recommended social economic policies
that correct for this bias (e.g. Madrian and Shea, 2001), thus translating an
abstract principie of context into a social one. Context, then, socially
embeds individuals, and the atomistic individual conception that ignores
context fails to represent individuals adequately.
Complexity economics investigates economic systems that exhibit nonlinear dynamics, and uses an approach termed agent-based modeling to
represent individuals in such systems (Tesfatsion, 2006). In contrast to
standard economics with its single conception of the individual as an
abstract atomistic being, complexity economics assumes agents or individuals are interactive and heterogeneous, and then explains the non-linear
dynamics of different economic systems in terms of the co-evolution of
different kinds of agents' expectations of each other and the systems they
jointly occupy. For example, Alan Kirman's fish market model distinguishes buyers who tend to be loyal to certain sellers from buyers who regularly visit many different sellers, and then investigates how one particular
fish market (in Marseille, France) evolves patterns of prices and distribution that reflects specific social-historical circumstances (Kirman, 2001).
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Another example is the Santa Fe stock market model (cf. Arthur, 1995),
which looks at different populations of agents, and traces the movement of
asset values that results from their interaction over time. As do the behavioralists, complexity theorists fault the atomistic individual conception as
a key obstacle to more realistic explanations of economies, and although
they do not base their arguments directly on a conception of the individual
as socially embedded (as do the six approaches discussed above), they end
up making a case for just such a conception.
All eight of the approaches discussed here, then, reject the dichotomy
between methodological individualism and methodological holism, and
employ sorne kind of structure-agent analysis in which causal influences
operate in two directions. The section that follows addresses two sets of
issues that arise in this framework.
2. Social identity and personal identity
One particularly important problem that the socially embedded individual
conception encounters is the problem of multiple selves. As a conception
of the individual that is 'externally' based in social relationships, individuals' multiple selves can be understood to be their different social identities,
or how they identify with others. As emphasized by Folbre (1994) and Sen
(2006), however, our different social identities often conflict with one
another, and this invites us to ask what the unity of the self consists in, and
indeed raises the question whether the socially embedded individual is a
single being at all. The multiple-selves problem also arises in connection
with the atomistic individual conception (e( Davis·, 2003, ch. 4), but that
this conception is 'internally' based in the prívate tastes of individuals
arguably makes the problem irresolvable (e( ibid.). In the case of the
socially embedded individual conception, in contrast, it is reasonable to say
that individuals have tiesto others and also act independently. The question is how this can best be explained.
How, then, does the individual with many social identities still count as
a single individual? Extending the identity concept, we can say that individuals with many social identities are single individuals when they are
shown to have personal identities consistent with their many social identities. Let us begin to explain this idea by making two points about the
concept of social identity. First, defining the concept of social identity as
the idea of individuals identifying with others, others may be understood
either as (a) social groups, such as are characterized by shared language,
ethnicity, religion, work etc., or as (b) simply other individuals, such as
friends, family members, neighbors etc. Second, whether social identity
takes the social group form or the other individuals' form, the idea of individuals identifying with others can be interpreted in two different ways
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depending on who is responsible for the identification. Either (a) individuals themselves can identify with others, or (b) they can be identified with
others by third parties.
These two distinctions allow us to set forth four types of social identity: (1) individuals themselves identify with other individuals; (2) individuals themselves identify with groups of individuals; (3) individuals are
identified with other individuals by third parties; (4) individuals are identified with groups of individuals by third parties. These four types are
shown in Figure 6.1. Examples of each are: (1) a person identifies with a
sick friend; (2) an immigrant identifies with a native language group; (3)
social service workers socially identify individuals according to their
family dynamics; (4) statisticians socially identify individuals according to
race and ethnicity.
Given that we are operating with a conception of the individual as
socially embedded, let us then explain an individual's personal identity
within this social identity framework. Doing so is consistent with the
socially embedded individual conception set out in the last section if we
suppose that individuals and social structures are mutually influencing. It
is also consistent with seeing socially embedded individuals as reflexive
beings if we define the personal identity of socially embedded individuals as an ability to organize and balance their many social identities by
Identification with

individuals

individuals

groups

( 1) sick friend

(2) native language

(3) social service workers

(4) statisticians

themselves

Who
determines

third parties

Figure 6.1

Types of social identity with examples
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engaging in self-reftection regarding what their different social ties and
social identities involve. We can see better what this involves by applying
Figure 6.1.
Consider the two cells in the first row where the difference is between
individuals themselves identifying with other individuals or identifying
with social groups. Here the ability of individuals to organize and balance
their different social identities, understood as maintaining personal identities, is a matter of how they themselves balance these two kinds of connections. For example, an immigrant may identify with a native language
group (a social group identification), but put this aside to care for a sick
friend (social identification with another individual), also from the same
native language group, who does not maintain that social identity. Other
combinations of course are also possible, and thus the point is that part of
what is involved in individuals having personal identities is how they themselves organize these two types of social identity.
Consider next the second row as contrasted with the first row. The second
row explains the social identities of individuals as society sees them, rather
than as individuals see them. As a structure- agent framework treats individuals and social structures as mutually inftuencing, the relationship
between personal identity and social identity also needs to capture the
inftuence society has on this understanding. That is, not only do individuals organize and balance their different kinds of social identities (plus the
different social identities within each category) in creating personal identities for themselves, but they must also contend with how society sees these
balances as well.
For example, in cell (3) a family social worker may make judgments
about family dynamics which family members must themselves appraise
relative to their own social identifications with one another. Whether such
judgments are accepted or rejected then involves individuals in balancing
and organizing their personal identities in a way that goes beyond how they
see these relations in the absence of third partíes. Or, in cell (4), social statisticians classify individuals as members of social groups, which individuals themselves appraise in judging their sense of their social group social
identities, since what social statisticians say may or may not be relevant
from the individual's perspective. Again, how individuals see their social
identities is infiuenced by how others see them.
The concept of personal identity used here is specific to the conception
of individuals as socially embedded, and contrasts with personal identity
concepts which ignore or de-emphasize sociality, and rather focus on individuals' psychological characteristics (e.g. Parfit, 1986). The concept here
also specifically addresses the concerns of Folbre (1994) and Sen (2006),
who recognize that our different social identities often confiict, raising the
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question whether the socially embedded individual is a single being at all.
Key to this understanding is the idea of reflexivity, or the idea that individuals can take a position towards themselves. That this individualizes
them is due to the fact that individuals can only take themselves as subjects
as objects. No one can truly adopt the subject perspective for other individuals. That behaving reflexively also gives a unity to the individual is due
to the singularity of this perspective. Yet that personal identity understood
in this way is framed in terms of individuals' social identities makes it
appropriate for thinking of individuals as socially embedded.
3. The problem of inequality
Inequality is an important problem for those concerned with social relationships, and who see individuals as socially embedded. Further, equality
is defended as a value by those who derive their normative ideals from
socialjustice views. But if individuals are all unique in having different personal identities in virtue of there being different ways in which they each
organize and balance all their different social identities, how should the
ideal of equality apply to them? One view of equality inscribed in many
nations' laws and constitutions and also in many international covenants
and doctrines is that equality is a matter of individuals having equal rights
to certain freedoms, such as religion, speech, political participation, cultural commitments and other liberties generally regarded as civil rights.
We might accordingly regard these freedoms as foundations for equality.
But this understanding of equality only takes us so far toward realizing
equality in that having equal civil rights is often compatible with considerable inequality when individuals are economically unequal. Unfortunately,
expanding our understanding of equality to include economic equality,
particularly as when understood as income inequality, encounters significant conceptual problems. Complete and comprehensive measures of
income inequality appear to be unavailable, so that what we are left with at
best is a loose 'quasi-orderings' framework whose application is inherently
problematic (Sen, 1997).
Paced with these difficulties, Sen recommends asking what the appropriate conceptual 'space' should be in which we investigate inequality, and suggests that we 'concentrate on the individual's real opportunity to pursue her
objectives' (ibid., p. 198). His reason is that it is not just income or the
goods bought with income that determines how individuals stand relative
to one another, but how individuals with their different personal characteristics are able to make use of income and the goods it allows them to bu y.
Focusing on 'the individual's real opportunity to pursue her objectives' captures this two-sided relation, and changes the 'space' in which we evaluate
inequality. Following Aristotle, then, this 'space' can be understood to be
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'the space of "functionings", the various things a person may value doing
(or being)' (ibid., p. 199). The approach Sen then develops is the 'capability approach', which represents individuals' real opportunities to pursue
their different objectives either in terms of their realized functionings or in
terms of the options or alternatives they possess, also understood as their
capabilities.
The capability approach thus makes a virtue out of the differences
between people, and promises a new approach to the problem of explaining inequality. Basically equality is a matter of individuals being equally
able to pursue their real opportunities or capabilities. But what does this
involve? Since any given individual has many capabilities, they might be
more or less successful in their pursuit of their capabilities according to
how many of them they are able to pursue. Individuals might then achieve
equality in sorne respects - for example, being well housed, having good
nutrition, and having adequate health care - but not achieve equality in
other respects - for example, education. This problem has led to arguments that there ought to be a list of basic or essential capabilities, all of
which individuals should be able to achieve if equality is to be achieved
(Nussbaum, 2003). Sen, however, believes there cannot be one single list of
essential capabilities, because we cannot anticípate what capabilities people
will wish to pursue in the future, because we cannot know what future individuals will understand about their world and wish to value, and because it
would be a denial of democracy to determine a list for others (Sen, 2005).
Nonetheless, there seems to be one basis on which equality might still be
understood in the capability framework. lt is suggested by Sen in his
Aristotelian rationale for making the 'space' in which we investigate
inequality the real opportunities-capability space when he says we need to
shift our focus to the 'various things a person may value doing' (Sen, 1997,
p. 198). The idea that individuals are able to determine what they value is
very close to the idea that they are able to reflexively evaluate themselves
relative to their options. In order to determine what one values, one must
ask how one's options fit into one's conception of oneself. This conception
can of course be changing as one pursues various objectives and creates
new ones. Indeed, there is an obvious dynamic involved in individuals pursuing the things they value doing over their lifetimes that is often framed in
terms of the idea of personal development.
How does this, then, link up with the idea of equality as a normative
ideal? The previous section defined the personal identity of socially embedded individuals in a reflexive way as individuals' ability to organize and
balance their many social identities through engaging in a process of selfreflection regarding what their different social ties and identities involve.
Although Sen's emphasis on the 'various things a person may value doing'
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is not immediately framed in terms of individuals' management of their
different social identities, this latter emphasis is not inconsistent with his,
and indeed Sen allows elsewhere that social identity plays a large role in life
(Sen, 2006). Thus, if equality is to be determined in the space of capabilities, and what capabilities individuals pursue is determined by individuals
themselves, then equality is a matter of individuals being equally able to
pursue their personal identities, as they see them. Of course this is a very
general view of equality, and it is hardly clear on the surface what would be
required to make this ideal a basis for concrete social economic policy.
Nonetheless, support for seeing individuals as being able to pursue personal identities as a foundation for equality links up with other normative
notions arguably also connected to equality. That is, it can be argued in
terms of the reflexivity idea that pursuing a personal identity is tied to such
normative values as freedom, having self-respect, and individual dignity
(Davis, 2006). Equality as a normative ideal, then, gains in clarity and credibility as it is integrated with and interpreted in terms of other accepted
normative ideals.
4. New directions
How will thinking about individuals in economics evolve in the future?
There has been considerable change in the economics research frontier in
recent decades, and all the new approaches that have emerged there in one
way or another criticize the atomistic individual conception, and lend
support for an understanding of individuals as socially embedded (Davis,
forthcoming). In addition, it has long been argued in heterodox economic
approaches that the atomistic individual conception does not stand up to
critical evaluation, and that individuals are socially embedded. Thus it is
worth asking what this apparent shift in thinking may entail, since in the
postwar period economics has been strongly structured around the idea
that individuals are essentially atomistic.
Consider, then, one influential result on the economics research frontier,
a recent laboratory experiment called the public goods game (Fehr and
Gachter, 2000). The game/experiment is organized around individuals
repeatedly contributing toa public good. In initial rounds of the game contributions are high, but as the game proceeds sorne individuals free-ride on
the contributions of others, ultimately leading most individuals to abandon
their contributions, so that the public good is no longer provided. A variation of the game, however, allows individuals to punish free-riders at a cost
to themselves, and this reduces free-ridership, and restores the public good.
The conclusion that is drawn from this is that the way in which the game is
played - with or without punishment - determines its outcome. Whether
public goods are provided in real economies, it follows, is also determined
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according to whether punishment of free-riders is possible. Put more generally, how interaction between individuals in economic life plays out is a
matter of the kind of institutional structure in which they are embedded.
The public goods game, of course, is a highly simplified experiment
meant to illuminate one specific principie, namely, that institutional structure plays a role in determining economic behavior. In contrast, in real
economies this kind of simplification tends to conceal rather than illuminate the complex ways in which institutions, social networks, values, habits,
inherited beliefs and expectations all interact to create the larger context in
which we observe individual behavior. Thus the logical strategy behind the
new research in economics that builds on experimental results and sees individuals as non-atomistic is to incorporate increasingly complex institutional considerations into the analysis in an effort to incorporate the role
complex social frameworks have in economic life. In effect, the goal is to
begin to see the economy as a social economy, where this refers to the larger
social space in which economic life occurs.
Thinking about individuals in economics in the future, then, may require
considerably more attention to social structure than has been the case in the
past, so that what it means for individuals to be socially embedded will
depend on a greater understanding of how individuals interact in different
and overlapping ways across social-institutional contexts. This would
almost certainly constitute an improvement in the understanding of individual interaction in current economics built around atomistic individuals
engaged at a distance with one another in markets. The argument of this
chapter is that this path of development for economics would preserve the
basic outlines of the socially embedded individual conception as set forth
here that sees individuals as reflexive beings influenced by and influencing
the social structures they occupy.
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